The empirical evidence that links the structure of a nation's political institutions and the distribution of the preferences of the actors that inhabit them to economic outcomes such as an improved policy environment, investment behavior and economic growth has grown dramatically in recent years. However, due to data limitations, virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades. This paper extends this empirical framework backwards in time and performs a two century long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over one hundred countries. The results demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in vital economic infrastructure not only in recent years but also at the inception of these technologies in the nineteenth century.
Introduction
The empirical evidence that links the structure of a nation's political institutions and the distribution of the preferences of the actors that inhabit them to economic outcomes such as an improved policy environment, investment behavior and economic growth has grown dramatically in recent years. However, due to data limitations virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades. The relatively small number of years available for analysis presents serious limitations for the interpretation of the results of these studies. Specifically, it is often difficult to separate the effect of unobserved country characteristics which may be correlated with or cause cross-national variation in political institutions from the effect of the institutions themselves.
While some progress has been made in addressing this concern using generalized method of moment estimators (Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996) , this article adopts a second path. It extends the empirical framework backward in time and performs a more than century-long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over one hundred countries. The results demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of cross-national variation in investment in vital economic infrastructure (the number of telephone handsets and megawatts of electrical generation) 1 not only in recent years but also at the inception of these technologies in the nineteenth century. The effect of cross-national and intertemporal variation in political institutions is shown to be independent of unobserved country-level and/or temporal variation as well as country-specific economic conditions.
Adopting an historical approach offers sufficient time series duration to separately identify this effect at the cost of sacrificing the richness of data available in studies that examine more recent, shorter and/or less diverse samples. However, in conjunction with related work that finds similar effects within more limited samples of countries, regions, industries and time periods (Mansfield, 1994; Campos and Nugent, 1998; Markusen, 1998; Dawson, 1999; Rose-Ackerman and Rodden, 1999) , this article provides additional evidence that the ability of a nation to credibly commit to a given policy environment is an important component in explaining investment levels within that country.
These results have important ramifications for the expected diffusion rates of both the vital components of an economy's infrastructure examined here as well as the diffusion of more recent innovations including digital communications networks.
Regardless of the relevant socioeconomic, demographic or policy related factors that may be thought to lead to rapid diffusion of these or other new technologies, countries lacking a credible policy regime will be at an extreme disadvantage when competing against other countries for infrastructure investment. From the perspective of the investor, analysis of the opportunity posed by a given country for private infrastructure investment that neglects a sophisticated analysis of the institutional environment will more likely result in an opportunity for the government to expropriate the investor that an opportunity for that investor to earn a fair return on their investment.
Theory 2

Infrastructure Stock and Returns to Capital
Although the main emphasis of this paper is on the manner in which political institutions affect the level of investment in telecommunications and electrical infrastructure in a given country, the analysis of political factors must also take into account the initial level of infrastructure stock already in place in that country. The current analysis thus shares with the macroeconomic growth literature (rooted in the models of Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) ) the insight that a country's existing level of capital stock-or in this case, infrastructure penetration, determines the level of marginal returns available from additional capital deployment and thereby influences the growth rate of the stock-or in this case, infrastructure penetration (see Barro (1992) ).
Counterintuitively for sectors commonly viewed as having "network" characteristics, diminishing marginal returns to capital are likely to be observed in panel data on infrastructure investment such as employed in this study. Within a single country over time, investment is likely to take place first in the highest return geographical areas (urban population centers) and then slowly spread to the remainder of the country. At a moment in time across a sample of countries, those countries at the frontier of infrastructure penetration must experiment with new technologies and invest not just in deployment of infrastructure but also in the development of new mechanisms for infrastructure supply and new products that may lead to additional demand. Laggard 2 For an expanded discussion of the link between political institutions and investment in infrastructure see and countries may, to some extent "free-ride" on the investment and experience of the countries that have preceded them.
The link between the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital and the proposition of an inverse relationship between infrastructure stock and infrastructure growth is the concept of transitional disequilibrium: countries cannot instantaneously attain their desired infrastructure stock levels given changes to the political or economic environment. Therefore, when these environmental conditions change over time or vary across countries, countries further ahead on the diffusion curve will experience less rapid growth than "laggard" countries.
Another prominent technological driver of cross-national variation in infrastructure investment is the effect of the passage of time. Infrastructure growth rates, like patterns of growth and diffusion of many other products and technologies (Romeo, 1975; Benvignati, 1982; Gort and Klepper, 1982; Oster, 1982; Quirmbach, 1986; Levin, Levin and Meisel, 1987; Rose and Joskow, 1990; Pennings and Harianto, 1992; Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994 , likely display an age dependence. Examining patterns of historical diffusion (see Figures 1 and 2 ) one observes relatively low to moderate growth rates in the initial decades after the initial penetration of infrastructure services followed --in some countries --by a rapid acceleration of growth and --in a handful of countries --a downward trend in penetration beginning in just the past few years. While some of this pattern may correspond to variation over time in the environmental variables described below, the similarity to patterns of diffusion of other technologies points to a role for technology as well.
Specifically, it may take some time after the availability of new infrastructure prior to widescale adoption and reorganization of economic organization to take advantage of the ubiquitous supply of these producers (David, 1989) . Later, growth rates may stabilize or even become negative as demand is saturated, more efficient consumption is realized and/or alternative products (e.g., cellular handsets) arrive in the marketplace.
Political Institutions and Investment
The relationship between the stock of a country's infrastructure and the growth rate of that infrastructure will be conditional on a set of country characteristics. Chief among these will be the country's ability to provide a credible policy environment for investors. Theoretical support for the economic impact of political institutions has expanded dramatically in the quarter century since (North and Thomas, 1973) first outlined a "transaction cost view of economic history." The crucial economic role played by socio-political factors which reduce the costs of bargaining, contracting, monitoring and enforcement has achieved the status of conventional wisdom in economic history (North and Weingast, 1989; Root, 1989; North, 1990; De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Mokyr, 1993; Landes, 1998) and development (Nelson, 1989; Nelson, 1990; North, 1990; Bates and Krueger, 1993; Campos and Lien, 1994; Brunetti and Weder, 1995; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Sachs and Werner, 1995; World Bank, 1995; Olson, 1996; World Bank, 1996; World Bank, 1997) . Scholars in both these domains agree that a government s ability to credibly commit not to interfere with private property rights is instrumental in obtaining the long term capital investments required for countries to experience rapid economic growth.
While these arguments are most transparent and likely strongest when considering private investors, so long as public sector managers with control over investment also engage in subgoal pursuit, in particular, the maximization of discretionary income streams, it is still reasonable to expect that the institutional environment will affect the incentives that managers of public sector organizations face to deploy capital. Like private sector managers, public sector managers face mechanisms that limit the extent to which they can pursue their subgoals at the expense of their political and financial principals. However, these mechanisms are relatively weak and leave public sector managers with substantial latitude to pursue subgoals. Specifically, both oversight (monitoring) and incentive-based measures that are operative in the private sector are less binding on public sector managers (Cameron and Duignan, 1984; Vining and Boardman, 1989; Scott, Bushnell and Sallee, 1990 ).
Because of the long time horizon, economies of scale and scope and highly political nature of the investment, investment in infrastructure will be especially sensitive to a country's institutional environment (Williamson, 1976; Levy and Spiller, 1994; Spiller and Vogelsang, 1996; Savedoff and Spiller, 1997; Bergara Duque, Henisz and Spiller, 1998; Caballero and Hammour, 1998) . Empirical work that has, to date, primarily adopted a case study approach provides strong support for this hypothesis (Grandy, 1989; Daniels and Trebilcock, 1994; Crain and Oakley, 1995; Levy and Spiller, 1996 ; Ramamurti, 1996; Savedoff and Spiller, 1997; Dailami and Leipziger, 1998) including two examples delving into economic history by examining the construction of the Spanish (Keefer, 1996) and New Jersey (Grandy, 1989) railways. Two recent efforts to extend this logic to panel datasets in telecommunications and electricity have also found strong support for the hypothesis that political institutions that fail to constrain arbitrary behavior by political actors dampen the incentive for infrastructure providers to deploy capital and, ceteris paribus, yield lower levels of per capita infrastructure investment. 
Economic Characteristics
In addition to the political forces described above, economic conditions are also likely to play an important role in the pattern of infrastructure investment across countries and over time. Data limitations of the century-long panel prohibit the inclusion of variables such as the composition of production of the economy, the cost of construction and the demographic characteristics of the population. However, some of these factors may be captured by examining cross-national variation in the level of income and in the rate of economic growth and allowing the effect of these variables on infrastructure growth to vary by country.
Measurement and Data
Political Constraints
The measure of political constraints employed in this paper estimates the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy) using the following methodology. First, extracting data from political science databases, it identifies the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) 4 with veto power over policy change in up to 160 countries in every year from 1800 to the present.
The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space.
This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional hazards using a simple spatial model of political interaction.
This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative branches. Such alignment increases the feasibility of policy change. The measure is then further modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch which increases (decreases) decision costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) executive branches. Detailed information on the construction of this variable along with a pair of sample derivations and mean values for each country for each decade are provided in Appendix 1.
Other Independent Variables
Data on infrastructure and other non-political factors that may be thought to influence infrastructure investment including real per capita income income, population levels, geographic area and macroeconomic aggregates are taken from Mitchell (1992;  4 Previous derivations of the political constraint index described here have included an independent judiciary and sub-federal political entities for a total of five potential veto points. Data limitations preclude their inclusion here. The effect of their omission will be to diminish the variance among countries with relatively high levels of political constraints thereby dampening the magnitude of the observed effect.
1993; 1995) and updated using The World Development Indicators, 1998 (World Bank, 1998 ).
Initial Investment
What are the determinants of the timing of a country's initial investment in infrastructure? Once the technology to transmit voice messages had been demonstrated by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 or to centrally generate electric power for transmission by Thomas Edison in 1882, many countries quickly followed the United States and adopted these technologies. However, outside of the United States and a core set of European countries, adoption times lagged into the decades and infrastructure growth rates after adoption are noticeably slower. While the level of economic development and the relationship between a country and the core set of industrialized nations clearly play a role, the theoretical arguments developed above also point to an important relationship between political constraints and time to adoption.
Specification
In order to test this hypothesis, a discrete time logit model is employed to examine the determinants of the transition from having no infrastructure investment to having some positive quantity.
Let H(t) equal the probability of adoption for a country at time t. According to our hypotheses there exist a set of country-level independent variables (w) that determine H(t).
H(t) = (w(t)
So as to insure that H(t) (the probability of adoption) is bounded by 0 and 1 in the empirical results, one commonly takes a logistic transformation:
Next, a separate observation record is created for every unit of time. Thus, if a country does not have its first telephone handset until 1883, that country has a record in each year after 1877 (the year after adoption by the United States) with a dependent variable equal to zero (no adoption) in each year until 1883 whereafter the dependent variable equals one (adoption). The full sample (including multiple observations for the same entry) is then estimated using a using a maximum likelihood estimator for the traditional logit specification. This technique addresses both the problems of censoring and time-varying explanatory variables.
Of the 6901 observed country-years with zero infrastructure penetration in telecommunications and the 5754 in electricity, less than three hundred cases possess data on the macroeconomic conditions. Unfortunately, this limited sample precludes independent testing of economic and political effects in this analysis. The independent variables included in the vector w(t) are therefore limited to:
Year since the initial adoption by any country of infrastructure of type x where x 0 [telephone headsets, megawatts of electricity generated]; 5 COLONY Dummy variable if country was a colony in year t; 6 5 Nonlinearities in the effect of the time trend on infrastructure growth rates were explored including the potential for a dependence on the level of political constraints but one can not reject the hypothesis of a linear effect. Examination of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that few countries have stabilized their infrastructure growth rates and only a handful have experienced negative growth.
POLCON
Political Constraint Index described in Section 3.1 and in Appendix 1; REGDUM A vector of regional dummies. Additionally, an F-test confirms that the regional dummies as a group are jointly significant at a p-value of 0.01. The inclusion of the political constraint index offers a substantial improvement upon the specification in which regional dummy variables, a time trend and colonial status enter alone. 7 In the case of telecommunications, the full model correctly predicts 93.4 per cent of non-adopting years and 93.6 per cent of adopting years or an 85.7 per cent improvement over a constant probability assumption.
Results
Similarly, in the case of electricity, the full model correctly predicts 89.1 per cent of nonadopting years and 92.5 per cent of adopting years for and 78.3 per cent improvement over a constant probability assumption. Table 2 displays the actual and predicted (both with and without the political constraint index) year of adoption of telecommunications and electrical generation infrastructure for each country in the sample. The improvement in the latter case is marked. Specifically, the average error in the predicted year of initial adoption declines from 16.3 years to 13.1 years in the case of telecommunications and from 9.2 to 7.6 years in the case of electricity.
Ceteris Paribus, ten years after the initial adoption by any country, an African country that is not a colony with political constraints one standard deviation above the mean is more than four times as likely (2.7 
Subsequent Investment
In order to attempt to take this alternate hypothesis into account, this section exploits post-adoption variation in the data to examine the determinants of cross-national and intertemporal variation in infrastructure growth rates. The unbalanced panel data sets contain up to 129 countries for as many as 119 years.
Specification
The econometric specification employed is: 
Estimation
I pool across time periods and countries with the exception of (1) the constant term, which is pooled across time periods only; (2) the growth in real GNP measure, which is also pooled across time periods only; and (3) the annual time period dummies, which are necessarily pooled across countries only.
Two econometric issues arise in estimating this equation. First, because the sample is a panel consisting of repeated observations on a broad cross-section of countries, the error term exhibits within-group serial correlation. I model the autocorrelation process as AR (1) and estimate the resulting transformed equation using nonlinear least squares. 9 The advantage of using this procedure rather than more traditional two-stage procedures such as Cochrane-Orcutt or Prais-Winsten is that, in addition to being asymptotically efficient, the nonlinear estimator is also robust to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the RHS.
10
Second, the sample exhibits groupwise heteroskedasticity. I correct for heteroskedasticity by applying weights to the data. These weights are inversely related to the within-group variance of the NLS residuals. I also report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White, 1980) . Table 3 reports the estimation results. With the exception of the dummy for colonies and some of the time and country-specific GDP growth coefficients, each variable is correctly signed and individually significant at a p-value of 0.01 or less.
Results
Additionally, F-tests confirm that the time-and country-specific GDP growth regressors are both, as a group, jointly significant at a p-value of 0.01 or less. The Durbin-Watson statistic ranges from 1.86 to 2.10 across the various specifications indicating that the 10 See (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993): 331-332 & 151-152) and (Fair, 1984) .
11 Future drafts will attempt alternate estimation techniques including the use of five-year panels to smooth out relatively "noisy" annual data as well as the use of a robust covariance matrix estimator based on that developed by Newey and West (Newey and West, 1987; Greene, 1997:503-506) . This covariance matrix estimator is consistent in the presence of within-unit serial correlation up to a specified lag and heteroskedasticity of unknown form. Compared with the alternative procedure of estimating one or more AR(n) terms, the use of the robust covariance matrix estimator has several advantages. First, it is computationally simpler. Not only does it easily accommodate autocorrelation that is of higher order than one, but it also simplifies estimation of models that are nonlinear in the parameters. The latter feature is especially advantageous in the current context because two of the three models used are nonlinear. Second, the robust covariance matrix estimator does not rely on an assumption that the different cross-sectional units share common autocorrelation parameters. Failure to make this assumption in the estimation of AR(n) models creates a need to estimate many additional parameters, which reduces the efficiency of the point estimator. Third, it is not necessary to drop observations from one or more time periods when using the robust covariance matrix estimator. The estimator differs from the original Newey-West version in that it is constructed for use in a panel setting rather than a conventional time-series setting (see Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and Froot (1989) 
Conclusion
By demonstrating that a sophisticated incorporation of the institutional environment improves the power of models that predict both the initial year of infrastructure adoption by a country and the subsequent rate of growth of that infrastructure, this paper attempt to address the critiques that unobserved country-level heterogeneity may be driving much of the reported correlation between the structure of a nation's political institutions and a broad set of economic outcomes. Since initial adoption decisions can not, by definition, be influenced by the existing level of infrastructure stock, concerns regarding the role of initial conditions combined with path dependency in explaining observed outcomes are somewhat alleviated by the adoption results reported here. Similarly, the reported results showing a statistically and economically significant link between political institutions and infrastructure growth rates even in a specification that includes country-and time-specific effects as well as country-specific slopes with respect to income growth, should alleviate concerns regarding unobserved country-level heterogeneity.
Of course, these results are unable to account for a host of alternate economic explanations that may play an important role. However, in conjunction with other studies that study a shorter time period and are therefore able to control for these effects, the evidence arguing for a sophisticated treatment of political institutions in the study of cross-national variation in economic outcomes appears increasingly strong.
Policymakers seeking to attract investment in vital infrastructure sectors should pay careful attention to the structure of the political institutions in their country and, if necessary, design mechanisms to compensate for institutional shortcomings.
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Deriving the measure of political constraints
In order to construct a structurally-derived internationally comparable measure of political constraints, the structure of political systems must be simplified in a manner which allows for cross-national comparisons over a wide range countries while retaining the elements of that structure which have a strong bearing on the feasibility of policy change. Here, I will focus on two such elements: the number of independent veto points over policy outcomes and the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit them. Without minimizing their importance, I set aside questions of agenda setting power, decision costs (Spiller, 1992; Schwartz, Spiller and Urbiztondo, 1994; Spiller and Tiller, 1997) and the relative political authority held by various institutions for subsequent extensions of the admittedly simplistic modeling framework presented here.
Political actors will be denoted by E (for executive), L1 (for lower house of legislature), L2 (for upper house of legislature). 13 Each political actor has a preference, denoted by X I where I ∈ [E, L1, L2]. Assume, for the time being, that the status quo policy (X 0 ) and the preferences of all actors are independently and identically drawn from a uniformly distributed unidimensional policy space [0, 1] . Data on actual preference distributions of political actors will subsequently be incorporated into the analysis loosening this assumption. The utility of political actor I from a policy outcome X is assumed equal to -|X -X I | and thus ranges from a maximum of 0 (when X = X I ) to a minimum of -1 (when X = 0 and X I = 1 or vice versa). Further assume that each actor has veto power over final policy decisions. While these are, admittedly, strong assumptions, the incorporation of more refined and realistic game structures and preference distributions presents severe complications for analytic tractability. It is hoped that, mirroring the development of the domestic positive political theory literature, the strength of the results obtained using the simple framework presented here will provide an impetus for future research.
The variable of interest to investors in this model is the extent to which a given political actor 14 is constrained in his or her choice of future policies. This variable is calculated as (1 -the level of political discretion). Discretion is operationalized as the expected range of policies for which all political actors with veto power can agree upon a 12 This section draws heavily from (Henisz, 1998) . 13 Data limitations of the panel preclude the inclusion of other veto points such as an independent judiciary, sub-federal units of power, administrative agencies and the like.
14 Without loss of generality, the remainder of the paper refers to changes in executive preferences. Note that since the preferences of all actors and the status quo policy are drawn identically from the same distribution, each actor, including the executive, faces the same constraints in changing policy. Allowance for the likelihood of multiple actors changing preferences simultaneously is made by incorporating information on alignment of preferences across the various branches of government later in the analysis. change in the status quo. For example, regardless of the status quo policy, an unchecked executive can always obtain policy X E and is guaranteed their maximum possible utility of 0. Investors face a high degree of uncertainty since the executive's preferences may change or the executive may be replaced by another executive with vastly different preferences. Therefore this is categorized as a polar case in which political discretion = 1 and political constraints equals 0 (1 -1) .
As the number of actors with independent veto power increases, the level of political constraints increases. For example, in a country with an effective unicameral legislature (L1), the executive must obtain the approval of a majority of the legislature in order to implement policy changes. The Executive is no longer guaranteed the policy X E as the legislature may veto a change from the status quo policy. The Executive can, at best, achieve the outcomes closest to X E that is preferred by the legislature to the status quo. Without additional information on the preferences of the Executive and the legislature it is impossible to compute the exact outcome of the game. Nor is the expected magnitude of the effect on political discretion of adding this additional veto point immediately clear. However, one of the virtues of the simple spatial model outlined above is that it provides a more objective insight into the quantitative significance of adding an additional veto point.
Given the assumption that preferences are drawn independently and identically from a uniform distribution, the expected difference between the preferences of any two actors can be expressed as 1/ (n+2) 15 where n is the number of actors. Assuming that there exist two political institutions with veto power (the Executive (E) and a unicameral legislature (L1)), the initial preference draw yields an expected preference difference equal to 1/(2 + 2) = 1/4. There are six possible preference orderings in this game (see Appendix Figure 1 ) that we will assume are equally likely to occur in practice. 16 In ordering (1), no change in executive preferences which retains the initial ordering of preferences yields a change in policy. The executive (X E = 1/4) prefers all policies between 1/2 -ε and 0 + ε to the status quo (X 0 = 1/2) while the legislature (X L1 = 3/4) prefers all policies between 1/2 + ε and 1 -ε to X 0 . As the executive and the legislature cannot agree on a change in policy, political discretion (the feasibility of policy change) equals 0 and political constraints equal 1. The same argument is true by symmetry for ordering (2). In the remaining orderings, both the executive and legislature agree on a direction in which policy should move relative to the status quo X 0 . These cases have closed form solutions other than the status quo policy. Their exact values depend on the assumption as to who moves first (or last) and the relative costs of review by each party. 15 See Rice (1995:p. 155 ). The intuition for this result is that the expectation of any single draw is equal to 1/2 but there exists variation across draws. Given a uniform distribution, the expected distance between any two adjacent positions declines proportionally to the number of additional draws. The exact formula is 1/(# of draws + 1).
However, in the absence of knowledge on the rules of the game in each country, the range of outcomes over which both parties can agree to change the status quo is used as a measure of political discretion. As this range expands, there exists a larger set of policy changes preferred by both political actors with veto power. The existence of such a set reduces the credibility of any given policy and therefore decreases the level of political constraints. In ordering (3), the executive (X E = 1/2) prefers policies between 1/4 + ε and 3/4 -ε to the status quo (X 0 = 1/4) while the legislature (X L1 = 3/4) prefers all policies greater than 1/4 + ε. There exists a range of policies approximately equal to 1/2 (between 1/4 + ε and 3/4 -ε), which both actors agree are superior to the status quo. The political discretion measure for this ordering therefore equals 1/2 yielding a political constraints measure equal to 1/2. The same is true in orderings (4), (5) and (6). The expected level of political constraints for the game {X E , X L1 } based on the number of veto points alone is the average of the political constraint measures across the six possible preference orderings: (1 + 1 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2)/6 = 2/3.
Note that this initial measure of political constraints is based solely on the number of de jure veto points in a given polity maintaining the strong and unrealistic assumption of uniformly distributed preferences. However, neither the Constitutional existence of veto power nor its prior exercise provide a de facto veto threat in the current period. Specifically, loosening the assumption of uniformly distributed preferences by allowing for preference alignment (i.e., majority control of the executive and the legislature by the same party) would be expected to expand the range of political discretion and thereby decrease the level of political constraints. In order to allow for this effect, the purely institutional measure of political constraints described above is supplemented with information on the preferences of various actors and their possible alignments. For example, if the legislature were completely aligned with the executive, the game would revert back to our simple unitary actor discussed above with a constraint measure of 0. The same exercise of determining constraints given the assumption of either completely independent or completely aligned actors was conducted for all observed institutional structures yielding the values for political constraints displayed in Appendix Table 1. Further modifications are required when other political actors are neither completely aligned with nor completely independent from the executive. In these cases, the party composition of the other branches of government are also relevant to the level of constraints. For example, if the party controlling the executive enjoys a majority in the legislature, the level of constraints is negatively correlated with the concentration of that majority. Aligned legislatures with large majorities are less costly to manage and control than aligned legislatures that are highly polarized.
By contrast, when the executive is faced with an opposition legislature, the level of constraints is positively correlated with the concentration of the legislative majority. A heavily fractionalized opposition may provide the executive with more discretion due to the difficulty in forming a cohesive legislative opposition bloc to any given policy. Information on the partisan alignment of different government branches and on the difficulty of forming a majority coalition within them can therefore provide valuable information as to the extent of political constraints.
Suppose, for example, that the party controlling the executive completely controls the other branch(es) of government (100% 17 of legislative seats). In this case, the values displayed in the appropriate right-hand column of Appendix Table 1 are utilized. However, as the executive's need for coalition building and maintenance increases (his or her majority diminishes), and under the assumption that the same party controls both branches, the values converge to the levels displayed in the left-most column. For the case in which the branches are controlled by different parties, the results are reversed. Now, complete concentration by the opposition (100% legislative seats) leads to the assignment of the values in the left-most column. As the opposition's difficulty of forming coalitions increases, the values converge to the levels displayed in the appropriate right-hand column. Following an extensive body of literature in political science on the costs of forming and maintaining coalitions, the rate of convergence is based upon the extent of legislative (or judicial) fractionalization (Rae and Taylor, 1970) .
The fractionalization of the legislature (or court) is equal to the probability that two random draws from the legislature or court are from different parties. The exact formula is:
where n = the number of parties, n i = seats held by nth party and N = total seats. The final value of political constraints for cases in which the executive is aligned with the legislature(s) is thus equal to the value derived under complete alignment plus the fractionalization index multiplied by the difference between the independent and completely aligned values calculated above. For cases in which the executives party is in the minority in the legislature(s), the modified constraint measure equals the value derived under complete alignment plus (one minus the fractionalization index) multiplied by the difference between the completely independent and dependent values calculated above. In cases of mixed alignment, a weighted (equally) sum of the relevant adjustments is used.
For example, in the case described above the constraint measure equaled 0 if the legislature was completely aligned and 2/3 if it was completely independent. However, if the same party controls the executive and the legislative chamber and the probability of two random draws from the legislature belonging to different parties equals 1/4 (the executive has a large majority in Parliament) then the modified constraint measure equals 0 + 1/4 * (2/3 -0) = 1/6. By contrast, if the executive relied on a heavily fractionalized coalition in which the probability that any two random draws were from different parties was 75%, the modified constraint measure would equal 0 + 3/4 * (2/3 -0) = 1/2. In the case where the opposition controls the legislature the values would be reversed. A heavily concentrated majority by the opposition would lead to a value of 0 + (1 -1/4) * (2/3 -0) = 1/2 while a fractionalized legislature would receive a score of 0 + (1 -3/4) * (2/3) = 1/6. This measure of political constraints has one important virtue that also yields several weaknesses. The strength of the measure is that it is structurally derived from a simple spatial model of political interaction which incorporates data on the number of independent political institutions with veto power in a given polity and data on the alignment and heterogeneity of the political actors that inhabit those institutions. The first weakness of the measure is that its validity is based upon the validity of the assumptions imposed upon the spatial model in order to generate quantitative results. Another weakness is that many features of interest are left out of the model including agenda setting rights, decision costs, other relevant procedural issues, the political role of the military and/or church, cultural/racial tensions, and other informal institutions which impact economic outcomes.
Constructing the measure of political constraints
Construction of a measure of political constraints based on the above methodology requires three types of data. First, information regarding the number of institutional players in a given polity; second, data on partisan alignments (including coalitions) across institutions; and, finally, data on the party composition of legislatures. All countries were assumed to have an executive. Data on the existence of other political actors (unicameral or bicameral legislatures 18 ) with substantive veto power was taken from the Polity database and Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) . The above data sources were then supplemented by various issues of The Political Handbook of the World and The Statesman's Yearbook to note the party distribution of the legislature(s): specifically, whether the executive enjoy a majority in one (or both) legislature(s) and how many seats in each legislature were controlled by each party. Based on this information, the values of institutional constraints were modified to form a measure of political constraints using the methodology described in the previous section.
Sample Calculation
Like the hypothetical example above, in 1990 Guyana had two veto points (an independent executive and a single legislative chamber). However, the same party (the People's National Congress) controlled the presidency and held 42 of the 53 legislative seats, with the remaining seats distributed among three other parties. The probability that two random draws from the legislature would be from different parties (the fractionalization index) was 35.4 percent. As a result, the initial constraint measure of 2/3 was scaled downwards to 0.237 to take into account the (imperfect) alignment of the legislative chamber with the executive branch. (Specifically, the final measure of 0.237 is 35.4% of the distance between the measure with no veto points or perfect alignment (0.000) and the value of the measure with one veto point and perfect opposition (2/3)).
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